CSM after ECHR ruling in Kovesi case: Interpretation of Constitution cannot prejudice principle of prosecutors' independence

The interpretation of the Constitution regarding the Justice Ministry's authority over prosecutors cannot prejudice the principle of their independence, Prosecutors' Section of the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) has stated on Tuesday, in the context of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling regarding the removal from office of former prosecutor-in-chief of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) Laura Codruta Kovesi.

"The Prosecutors' Section argues that it is unfortunate to find a violation of the fundamental rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights through a procedure carried out against a senior magistrate of the Public Ministry, a procedure that concluded with the decision to remove her from office," a Prosecutors' Section release sent to AGERPRES on Tuesday informs.

According to the quoted source, the Prosecutors' Section also reiterates in this context the need to urgently amend the Romanian legislation governing the procedures for the appointment and removal in high positions within the Public Ministry, in agreement with the constant recommendations of international bodies, in view of strengthening the Prosecutors' Section's role within the Superior Council of Magistracy.

Moreover, the Section also underscores that the interpretation of the Romanian Constitution aimed at the authority of the Minister of Justice over prosecutors "cannot prejudice the principle of the independence of prosecutors."

Laura-Codruta Kovesi won on Tuesday at the European Court of Human Rights the trial by which she challenged the decision that had her removed from the office of prosecutor-in-chief of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), a press release of the institution based in Strasbourg informs.

According to the ECHR, Romania violated Kovesi's rights by removing her from office before the end of her term.

According to the ECHR ruling, there had been no way for the applicant to bring a claim in court against her dismissal as such proceedings would only have been able to examine the formal aspects of the presidential decree for her removal and not her substantive argument that she had been incorrectly removed for criticising the legislative changes in corruption law.

Furthermore, the ECHR also found that her right to freedom of expression had been violated because she had been dismissed for those criticisms, which she had made in the exercise of her duties on a matter of great public interest.